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Abstract
Existing evidence for unconditional convergence in the OECD is mixed, and
depends largely on whether time series or cross sectional methods are used. In this
paper we reconsider the evidence for unconditional convergence by dividing the
long run data into several subperiods. We use a two stage approach in this work.
We ﬁrst model the growth rate of output directly and use this model to estimate
the long-run growth rate for the countries in our sample. We then use the estimates
of long-run growth in output to test for unconditional convergence and to test for
equality of long-run growth across countries. GLS is used to explicitly take into
account the sampling uncertainty inherent in our estimates of the long-run growth
rate we found in the ﬁrst stage of the process. The results show strong evidence
for unconditional convergence in the post WWII period 1951-1974, but no evidence
of convergence in the periods preceding or following this period. Moreover, it is
diﬃcult to reject the hypothesis that most of the countries in our sample had the
same growth rate outside of this period. Thus ﬁnd little evidence to suggest that
absolute convergence has been a continuous long run process, and some evidence
for the view that national policies mainly aﬀect income levels rather than growth
rates.
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11 Introduction
Over long periods of time, very small diﬀerences in countries’ growth rates can have
enormous consequences for standards of living. This simple fact makes the study of long
run growth rates an important tool for understanding why welfare levels diﬀer across
countries. In particular, Abramovitz (1986) and Baumol (1986) used long run annual
data on GDP per capita to compare the patterns of long run growth across countries.
They found that since 1870, the poorest countries in the OECD had caught up to a
considerable extent with the leaders.1
The subsequent convergence literature has followed two distinct approaches, however.
The ﬁrst approach extended the cross sectional comparisons of Baumol (1986) by in-
cluding additional conditioning variables, Dowrick and Nguyen (1989), Barro (1991) and
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). This literature ﬁnds that conditional convergence (also
called conditional ¯ convergence) is a fairly robust result.
This cross section deﬁnition of convergence contrasts with the results the second ap-
proach, based on time series techniques developed by Bernard and Durlauf (1995). They
deﬁne convergence as the forecast of an eventual disappearance of diﬀerences in per capita
outputs between countries.2 With a sample of 15 OECD countries, Bernard and Durlauf
(1995) reject their convergence hypothesis for most pairs of countries, but do ﬁnd evi-
dence of a common stochastic trend among many countries.3 Likewise Evans (1998) ﬁnds
1They argued that the long run pattern of growth supported the thesis of the advantage of relative
backwardness - that there were signiﬁcant international technological spill-overs between countries with
similar levels of “social capability”. See for example Gerschenkron (1952), Lewis (1955) and Ohkawa and
Rosovsky (1973). De Long (1988) showed that that since the OECD sample was, ex-post, a sample of
relatively wealthy countries, this sample selection created a strong bias in favour of ﬁnding convergence.
This limits the extent to which we may draw inferences from the experience of this sample of countries.
Nevertheless as emphasized by Baumol and Wolﬀ (1988), the study of convergence in the OECD is
interesting in its own right since there are very important welfare implications for the countries involved.
Second focusing on the OECD is important as it stands out as an exception from the general pattern of
divergence between the world’s richest and poorest countries.
2Hence if the diﬀerences in output levels between two countries contain a unit root, a time trend or
are co-integrated, then this type of convergence can be rejected.
3Similar results are also found by Campbell and Mankiw (1989). For a general survey of the empirical
2that there is no appreciable diﬀerence in trend growth rates across his sample of OECD
countries.
It may be noted that the ﬁnding of no convergence of per capita incomes in the time series
literature, is consistent with the very robust ﬁnding of conditional ¯ convergence in the
cross sectional literature. In particular if countries have diﬀerent long run productivity
growth rates or more generally, diﬀerent steady steady state income levels, conditional
¯ convergence may be consistent with absolute divergence of income levels, Durlauf and
Quah (1999). For this reason the hypothesis of absolute convergence of per capita incomes
(either unconditional ¯ convergence or unconditional forecast convergence) is arguably
more interesting than conditional convergence, particularly if the motive for studying
convergence is to infer how welfare levels have changed over time in diﬀerent countries.4
There are however several well known problems with the time series forecasting measures
of convergence. First, Durlauf and Quah (1999) have pointed out that the techniques are
not well suited to handling structural breaks or series where the data generating process
is not time invariant.5 Second, the criterion for convergence has been argued to be too
strict, requiring an expectation of complete convergence in the future. From a welfare
perspective it is also interesting to know whether countries have converged partially, over
some ﬁnite time span. Third, unit root tests have low power when the data are generated
by shocks that have high persistence. Thus typical time series convergence tests require
long series, such as Maddison’s data covering approximately the last 100 years, Maddison
(1995).6
growth literature see Barro and Sala-i Martin (1995) and Durlauf and Quah (1999).
4As emphasized by Durlauf and Quah (1999), tests for convergence have little ability to discriminate
among alternative schools of thought, since conditional and unconditional convergence can be generated
by most growth theories.
5A discontinuity on the series will bias the results in favour of not rejecting the unit root hypothesis.
Evidence of structural breaks in the time series of per capita GDP comes from Jones (1995), Ben David
and Papell (1995), Li and Papell (1999), Ben David and Papell (2000).
6For example Cheung and Pascualy (2004) show that when the length of the series is restricted, the
results of time series tests for convergence are very sensitive to whether the null hypothesis is convergence
or non-convergence.
3Given these restrictions, the time series approach does not easily permit the possibility
that the process of convergence may changed at diﬀerent points in history. This is un-
fortunate since Abramovitz (1986), using simple measures of the cross sectional variance
of income levels, found that the rate of convergence had changed over the late 19th and
20th centuries.7
The aim of this paper therefore is to compare the relative growth performance of the
OECD over the whole period, 1870-1998, and more particularly, also over several subpe-
riods. To do this we use a two stage strategy. In the ﬁrst stage we use the seemingly
unrelated regression model to estimate long-run growth rates for each country in our
sample from annual time series data. In the second stage we use these estimated long-
run growth rates to test for conditional ¯ convergence and equality of growth rates across
our sample of countries. We account for the sampling uncertainty inherent in stage one
by using generalized least squares in stage two. The advantage of this method is that it
does not depend on the outcome of any pre-tests for non-stationarity of the data. We
obtain eﬃcient estimates of growth rates with relatively small sub-samples of the long
run data.
We ﬁnd ﬁrst, that we even though the standard errors on estimated growth rates tend to
be quite large, we can reject the hypothesis that all of the 16 OECD countries had the
same long run growth rate for the whole sample period. Moreover we ﬁnd that there is a
signiﬁcant negative relationship between the initial income levels and subsequent growth
rates, for the group as a whole. Thus, even allowing for time series variance our results
support the Baumol hypothesis and reject common growth rates.
When we break down the sample period into subperiods however, a diﬀerent story
emerges. In particular we ﬁnd that the convergence result for the entire period, 1870-
7Abramovitz (1986) shows that the variance in income levels, as measured by the coeﬃcient of
variation, declines rapidly in the post-WWII recovery era, but increases in the period leading up WWII.
The variance declines slowly in late 19th century and the late 20th century.
41998 can be entirely explained by the post-war recovery era - there is no evidence of
convergence in any of the remaining subperiods. The results tend to suggest that even
within the OECD, unconditional convergence was the exception rather than the norm.
Our second set of results relate to the tests for common growth rates. We reject the
hypothesis of common growth rates over the remaining subperiods for the full sample of
countries. Nevertheless we show that for a sub-sample of 13 of the 16 countries, it is very
diﬃcult to reject the hypothesis that each country had the same growth rates for any
periods, except the post war recovery period, 1951-1974. This result tends to mirror the
time series result such as Evans (1998) and Bernard and Durlauf (1995) that ﬁnd long
run growth rates are co-integrated.
We conclude that unconditional convergence was not a continuous process but a tempo-
rary event. Thus we view our results as casting some doubt on the view that convergence
in the OECD was due to a continuous trend of technology catch-up. A plausible alterna-
tive source of convergence may simply be the exogenous political events after WWII. This
is supported by the the ﬁnding that, apart from the post war period, most of the OECD
countries followed very similar growth paths. Moreover these two ﬁndings go some way
to reconcile the diﬀering results found in the time series and cross sectional literature.
Nevertheless we view our results as being generally supportive of the inferences drawn
from the time series approach of Bernard and Durlauf (1995) and others, rather than the
cross section approach.
2 Estimating Long Run Growth rates
Maddison (1995) presents real output per capita data for seventeen OECD countries for
the period 1870 to 1995. Our data consists of this primary data, updated to 1998 using
Maddison (2001). We are interested in estimating the long-run growth rate of output
5for each country in the sample. We start by modelling the data generating process of
the annual (short-run) growth rate of real output. Thus, letting Qt be the level of real
output per capita and let qt = lnQt, we aim to model the time series properties of the
percentage growth rate of real output ¹t = ∆qt.
Figure 1: Growth Rates of Real Output: OECD (1870-1998)






































Figure 1 depicts the short-run growth rate time series used in this study. It is evident
from this ﬁgure that the growth rate series potentially contains mild serial correlation
and that there appears to be a reduction in variance in the latter part of the Twentieth
Century.
In the ﬁrst stage of our process we aim to calculate long-run growth rates for each country
in our sample. It is common in the convergence literature to use either the average of
the short-run yearly growth rates of output or the diﬀerence in output divided by the
time period as the estimate of the long-run growth rate for a particular country. Using
6these measures of long-run output growth is equivalent to assuming that output follows
a simple random walk. That is, the data generating process for output is
qt = ® + qt¡1 + ²t;
where yt is the level of output in period t.











Once calculated, these estimates of the long-run growth rates are then used in the second
stage of the problem as regressors in various regression analyses used as tests various
forms of convergence.
There are a number of potential problems with this approach. First, the long-run growth
rates calculated in the ﬁrst stage are only estimates and are aﬀected by sampling error.
The sampling error is potentially diﬀerent across the countries in the sample thus leading
to heteroscedasticity in the second stage regressions. Second, this estimate of the long-
run growth rate is only valid if there are no short-run dynamics present in the underlying
data generating process for the growth rate of output. Ignoring the presence of short-run
dynamics would lead to biased estimates of the long-run growth rate. Finally, given that
the sample we are looking at covers a large period of time there is a problem, discussed
in Maccini and Pagan (2003), of a reduction in the variance of output over time.
The method described below aims to account for the last two of these three potential
problems with the current literature. We describe a model that allows for short-run
dynamics in the growth rate of output and allows for a reduction in the time series
variance of output over time.
7Consider the following autoregressive, levels in volatility (ARVL) model for short-run
growth,
(¹t ¡ ¹) =
p X
j=1
µj(¹t ¡ ¹) + ¾t²t; (1)
where ¹ is the unconditional mean of the time series, f¹tg
1
t=¡1, and ¾t is the conditional
variance. Serial correlation in the time series is described by (µ1;:::;µp)0 and ²t is assumed
to have mean zero and unit variance.




Thus, (1) and (2) describe the DGP of short-run growth used to estimate the long-run
growth rate, ¹. The estimation of ¹, and its variance, is a two step procedure. In the
ﬁrst step (1) is estimated using OLS.8 Residuals from this regression are then used to
estimate ±. If ± is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0, the data is then re-weighted using Q±
t¡1
as the weight for period t.
The second stage of the estimation procedure involves estimating
¹t = ® +
p X
j=1
µj¹t¡j + ²t (3)
using the re-weighted data. In only three cases, Denmark, Germany and Norway, ± was
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0. In those cases, a standard AR(p) was used. For all
other countries, an ARVL(p) model was used.
8The lag length parameter, p, is chosen to minimize the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion
(SBIC).
8To improve eﬃciency the individual equations were estimated using a Seemingly Unre-








These long-run growth rates are then used to test for the existence of unconditional ¯
convergence and to test for the equality of long-run growth rates across countries in the
O.E.C.D. Estimates of the long-run growth rates, both for the full sample and for various
sub-periods can be found in the next Section.
3 Testing for Unconditional ¯ Convergence
First, we estimate the long-run growth rate, ¹ for the full period (1870-1998) for all
countries in our sample. The estimated long-run growth rates, together with their 95%
conﬁdence intervals are depicted in Figure 2. The vertical full line depicts the median
growth rate for this period while the dashed lines depict the ﬁrst and third quartiles.
This ﬁgure shows that the variance of the growth rates of each country is quite large
relative to the diﬀerences in growth rates across countries. There is approximately a 1.5
percentage point diﬀerence between the slowest growing country in the sample, Australia
and the fastest, Japan. The 95% conﬁdence interval for most countries is around 4-5
percentage points however. Thus for most pairs of countries there is a substantial overlap
of the conﬁdence interval these conﬁdence intervals. This reﬂects the fact that annual
deviations in growth rates from the trend are large. This variance cannot be ignored
however. Its presence indicates that there is considerable uncertainty surrounding point
estimates of trend growth rates.
The estimated long-run growth rates are then used to check for convergence in our data
set.
9Figure 2: 95% Conﬁdence Intervals for Long Run Growth Rates: 1875-1998 (Full Sample)

















Long Run Growth Rate
10Figure 3: Long Run Growth Rates vs Initial GDP per Capita: 1875-1998































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1The ﬁrst period is the period preceding the start of World War I (WWI), 1870-1913. As
emphasized by De Long (1988), the pre 1914 data tend to be less reliable than subsequent
data due to historians eﬀorts to reconstruct data back to WWI. Moreover, this period
corresponds to the gold (or other precious metal) monetary standard.
The second period includes the years from the start of WWI until the end of World War
II (WWII), 1914-1949. As noted by Abramovitz (1986) there was a signiﬁcant amount of
ﬁnancial and political instability in the aftermath of WWI, culminating in WWII. This
period therefore includes the two great wars and the Great Depression. All countries in
our sample were aﬀected in some way or another by these three great events. We refer
to this period of instability as the “War” period.
The post WWII years are divided into two periods. The ﬁrst is years following WWII up
until the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods agreement in 1974, and the oil price shocks.9
We denote this as the “Post War Recovery” period. The ﬁnal period covers the years
1975 to 1998 and will be referred to as the “Post Bretton-Woods” period. This period
also contains the beginning of the productivity slowdown.10
The diﬀerences across the four sub-periods can easily be seen in Figure 4, which depicts
the distribution of the estimated mean long-run growth rates for each sub-period. The
boxes represent the interquartile range while the stems depict the largest and smallest
value that is not more than 1.5 interquartile ranges away from the ﬁrst or third quartile.
Outliers are depicted with a ‘+’ symbol and are estimated long-run growth rates that are
more than 1.5 interquartile ranges away from the ﬁrst or third quartiles. In the “Gold
9The choice of 1974 as the end of Bretton-Woods is arbitrary but is consistent with transition dates
used in the macroeconomic literature. Speciﬁcally Bretton-Woods began to fall apart in the early part
of the 1970’s with the U.S.A pulling out in 1973.
10It should be noted that the choice of break points was not the result of formal testing. However,
standard Chow-type tests do ﬁnd that the estimated long-run growth rates for these four periods are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other. Ben David and Papell (1995) and Li and Papell (1999) do testing
for the presence of structural breaks and ﬁnd evidence of breaks in the growth rates for a similar sample
of countries centering on WWII for war aﬀected countries, and in the late 1920’s for non war aﬀected
countries. These tests however do not permit more than one such break.
12Figure 4: Distribution of Estimated Long-Run Growth Rates by Sub-Period





























Standard” period Canada is the outlier with a substantially higher mean long-run growth
rate. In the “Post-War Recovery” period Japan is the outlier and in the last period New
Zealand is the outlier. The line in the middle of the box is the median of the distribution.
It is clear from this Figure that the distribution of long-run growth rates changes over
the sample period. First, there appears to be a general increase in the median long-run
growth rate over time. Second, the dispersion of growth rates is bigger for the two middle
sub-samples. The “Post-War recovery” period clearly contains the biggest variation of
the four sub-periods and also the largest median long-run growth rate. We interpret this
to be the result of the large variation in outcomes across countries, of both the war and
the post-war reconstruction. This period of great ﬂux had the eﬀect of “re-shuﬄing” the
relative positions of countries and displacing them their long-run balanced growth paths.
Figures 5 through 8 plot the estimated long-run growth rates, and their 95% conﬁdence
13intervals, against the logarithm of the initial level of income, for these subperiods. It
can be seen that the only period in which there appears to be a negative relationship
between the estimated long-run growth rate and output is the post war recovery period,
1945-1974. In all other periods, a visual inspection does not reveal any clear relationship
between long-run growth and the initial level of income.
Figure 5: Estimated LR Growth Rates vs Log Initial Income: 1875-1913



































4Figure 6: Estimated LR Growth Rates vs Log Initial Income: 1914-1945



























































































































5Figure 8: Estimated LR Growth Rates vs Log Initial Income: 1975-1998
































3.1 Estimates of unconditional ¯ convergence rates
It may be noted that the existence signiﬁcant negative slope in the preceding diagrams
indicates convergence is the sense used by Baumol (1986). As put eloquently by Durlauf
and Quah (1999), this deﬁnition diﬀers from the time series deﬁnition, in that it refers
to a reduction in contemporary diﬀerences in levels of GDP per capita, as opposed to
the expectation of their eventual disappearance. Our interest however is primarily in
the historical issue of whether convergence actually occurred over a given period. Thus
the unconditional ¯ convergence deﬁnition - whether countries that were initially poorer
grew faster over the period - is relevant. As noted, this is a weaker concept of conver-
gence than the forecasting deﬁnition, since it does not imply that income levels of any
pair of countries must eventually be equal. Nevertheless it may have important welfare
consequences, even if the stronger deﬁnition of eventual equality of income levels is not
satisﬁed.
16In our model, however, we nevertheless allow for the fact that the underlying long run
productivity growth rate is observed with noise. Speciﬁcally, random technology and
policy shocks may causes the observed growth rate to deviate from the underlying long
run growth rate. In view of this the following regression equation was estimated for each
sample:
¹i = ® + ¯ log(GDP)i0 + ²i; (5)
where ¹i is the long-run growth rate calculated using the method described above, and
GDPi0 is the initial level of real output.
This speciﬁcation is superﬁcially very similar to Baumol (1986). Note however that we




i = ¹i + ºi:
The equation that is estimated is therefore
¹
¤ = ® + ¯ log(GDP)i0 + "i; (6)
where "i = ²i + ºi. Note that the standard least squares assumptions still apply here as
GDPi0 is not used to estimate the long-run growth rate in the ﬁrst stage of the process.
Hence we do not suﬀer from a generated variable problem and the error term, "i, is still
uncorrelated with the regressor. Hence OLS is still consistent but not eﬃcient as (6)
suﬀers from known heteroscedasticity.
The ﬁrst column of Table 1 shows the results of OLS estimates for (6), where the depen-
dant variables are simply the point estimates of the growth rates for each country. It can
be seen that there is evidence of convergence over the entire period, and also over each
subperiod except the modern Post Bretton Woods era, 1975-1998. The results also show
however that the rate of convergence was much higher during the post WWII recovery,
171951-1974, than in any of the other periods. Next consider the second row of Table 1
which reports GLS estimates of (6) that explicitly take into account the uncertainty in
the estimates of the long-run growth rate, using Monte Carlo methods.












As might be expected the results show that, once we allow for the time series variance in
the per capita GDP data, the standard errors of the estimated convergence rates become
much larger. Despite this there is still a signiﬁcant estimated convergence coeﬃcient on
for the entire period 1870-1998, and also for the post-WWII recovery. The convergence
estimates for the remaining three periods, which are all marginally signiﬁcant under OLS,
however become very insigniﬁcant when uncertainty in the estimates of ¹ are explicitly
modelled.
The results therefore seem to reject the view that there was a continuous time invari-
ant process of convergence with poorer countries growing steadily faster than the richer
countries. As suggested by Abramovitz, the process of convergence was quite varied.
Our results not only verify this in a somewhat more formal manner, but suggest that,
the experience of convergence, in any statistically signiﬁcant sense, was entirely conﬁned
to the Post WWII recovery era.
184 Testing for the equality of growth across countries
If we accept that there was essentially no convergence over most eras of last century,
this leaves open the possibility that each country was experiencing the same long run
productivity growth rate for extended periods exceeding 20 years. In particular, a number
of studies have found evidence that the output series of many of the OECD countries
are following a common stochastic trend.11 Co-integration of GDP per capita series for
diﬀerent countries implies that in the very long run their growth rates will be the same.
Nevertheless it is possible that long run growth rates may be the same over some extended
periods, which are interrupted by structural breaks.
To investigate this we consider whether we can reject the hypothesis that ¹i, are equal
across countries. For each country, j, the equation that was estimated was











For a given time period the null and alternative hypotheses are
H0 : ¹1 = ¹2 = ::: = ¹16 v: HA : ¹i 6= ¹j for some i 6= j: (7)
The null hypothesis can then tested using a non-linear Wald test.
Table 2, shows the p-values and Wald statistic for the whole period, 1875-1998, and each
11In particular see Evans (1998) who ﬁnds that the levels of GDP per capita in a sample of 13 OECD
countries were co-integrated.







of the subperiods. The results show that for the whole period, 1875-1998, the Wald
statistic was 29.77 with a p-value of 0.01, and hence the null can be rejected the 1%
level. This is consistent with the earlier ﬁnding of signiﬁcant convergence across the
whole sample period. Likewise, in the post war era 1951-74, the null is strongly rejected,
consistent with our earlier ﬁndings.
Of greater interest are the remaining subperiods where there was no evidence of con-
vergence. Here we ﬁnd that the null can also be strongly rejected for the modern post
Bretton Woods era, 1975-1998. For the pre-WWI or Gold standard era, 1875-1913, the
null can be rejected at the 10% level. The strongest evidence for equal growth rates in
Table 2 is the “War” period 1914-1950. Here we ﬁnd that the null hypothesis that the
growth rates are equal cannot be rejected at any reasonable level of conﬁdence(p=0.65).
These results then contrast with the ﬁnding that these output series are co-integrated. In
particular Evans (1998) ﬁnds that all the per capita output series of the countries in his
sample are following a common stochastic trend, while Bernard and Durlauf (1995) ﬁnd
this holds for many pairs of countries. Though a common stochastic trend does not imply
that countries will have the same growth rate over any given ﬁnite period, t¡t0, it does
imply that the the growth rates converge as t ! 1. In view of this, given suﬃciently
long time periods, one may expect to ﬁnd similar growth rates among these countries.
In view of this we then considered whether the ﬁnding, that the null hypothesis of equal
20growth rates can be rejected in most subperiods, was robust to small changes in the
sample of countries. We ﬁnd in fact that the rejection of the null is not robust to these
changes. To illustrate this, Table 3 and Table 4 report the convergence results and the
Wald tests, for a sample of 13 OECD countries.12



















First the results show that convergence results still hold. Under GLS there is no evidence
of convergence in any subperiod, except the post war reconstruction era. With respect
to the Wald tests for equality of growth rates across countries, however, the results have
changed quite dramatically. The p-values for the three sub periods, other than the post-
war period, are now 0.26, 0.34 and 0.54. Thus, for 13 countries in our sample of 16, it is
12The countries excluded are Canada, New Zealand, and Germany.
21very diﬃcult to reject the null hypothesis of equal growth rates with any conﬁdence.
The results then, are quite consistent with the ﬁnding of co-integration among most of the
OECD countries, as found by Bernard and Durlauf (1995).13 Unconditional convergence
of per capita outputs appears to have been a rare event event for most OECD countries,
over the last 100 years, and conﬁned to the post war era. For the rest of the time there
are diﬀering growth experiences overall, though we have also shown that for a sub-sample
of 13 of the 16 countries, it is diﬃcult to reject the null hypothesis of common long run
growth rates.14
Our results also broadly correspond to Abramovitz (1986) who gives rich narrative of
the relative economic performances for the OECD countries. In contrast to Abramovitz
however, our more formal tests ﬁnds no support for convergence prior to the Post War
Recovery era.15 This fact, combined with the inability to reject tests for equality of
growth rates across most countries, suggests that national growth rates for this group
are primarily determined by international, rather than domestic factors. Thus the results
also provide some empirical support for recent models that emphasize the importance of
international links in determining national productivity growth rates.16
13Evans (1998) ﬁnds a common trend for all the countries in his sample, however his sample size is 13
rather than 16.
14Clearly it is interesting to speculate what might explain the diﬀering experiences of the omitted
countries. New Zealand has experienced slow growth since 1974, but the reasons why are debated
extensively. Canada is an outlier due to the Wheat boom in the ﬁrst sub-sample. However a thorough
analysis of these countries relative experience is clearly warranted, and could provide useful policy
insights.
15According to Abramovitz (1986), the forces of convergence existed since the late 19th century, but
were unleashed by social changes following WWII.
16For example see Eaton and Kortum (1996), Parente and Prescott (2000) and Acemoglu and Ventura
(2001). They are also consistent with Jones (2002), who shows that the USA growth rate has been
approximately constant over the post war era, despite a very large expansion of research sectors in the
USA and the G5 countries.
225 Conclusion
Identifying diﬀerences in long run growth rates and in particular, convergence of income
levels between countries, helps in understanding the sources of contemporary diﬀerences
in income levels, and hence standards of living across countries. The existing evidence for
unconditional convergence in the OECD is mixed however. There is substantial evidence
for conditional and unconditional ¯ convergence in the cross country literature, yet little
evidence of forecast convergence in time series literature. The purpose of this paper has
been to consider how evidence for ¯ convergence in the OECD, has changed throughout
the last century, taking account of fact that the true growth rate is observed with noise.
Moreover, by working with ﬁrst diﬀerences (in the logarithm of GDP per capita) we avoid
the need for pre-tests for stationarity, and our tests for convergence are not predicated
on the assumption that the data generating process is time invariant.
These features of our method allow us to consider relatively short periods of time. Thus
we divide the sample period 1870-1998 into for periods associated with known structural
changes. Comparing growth rates across OECD countries we ﬁnd that, like Baumol and
Abramovitz and others, than there was unconditional ¯ convergence hypothesis in our
sample across the entire period. Nevertheless, we also ﬁnd that all of this convergence
occurred in the Post War Recovery era. For the remaining periods there is no evidence
of convergence. In addition we ﬁnd that for 13 of the 16 OECD countries in our sample,
the hypothesis of equal growths cannot be rejected at reasonable conﬁdence levels.
The results are consistent with both the the unconditional forecast convergence literature,
and the cross sectional literature. Cross-country ¯ convergence did occur, but there is
no evidence that this is a long run trend. We conclude therefore that convergence as
not been a steady process. Rather the Post War period of convergence, is ﬂanked by
periods of non-convergence, and for many of the OECD countries in our sample, periods
of parallel growth paths.
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